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The concept of “odious debt” regroups a particular set of equitable considerations that have 
often been raised to adjust or sever debt obligations in the context of political transitions, 
based on the purported odiousness of the previous regime and the notion that the debt it 
incurred did not benefit, or was used to repress, the people. This paper begins with an 
exploration of the grounds of the “odious debt” concept in basic international law structures 
and principles. The international law obligation to repay debt has never been accepted as 
absolute, and has been frequently limited or qualified by a range of equitable considerations, 
some of which may be regrouped under the concept of “odiousness.” This is consistent with 
the accepted view that equity constitutes part of the content of “the general principles of law 
of civilized nations”, one of the fundamental sources of international law stipulated in the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. At the same time, most debt contracts between 
States and private creditors are governed by the domestic private law specified in the 
contract. The legal systems of these jurisdictions may well have concepts such as “clean 
hands” or the notion that contracts related to illegal purposes are invalid. These concepts 
overlap with elements of the notion of “odiousness” as a basis for invalidating debt 
obligations. Investor/state arbitration tribunals, for example, have been comfortable taking 
into account such considerations in determining whether repudiation of contractual 
obligations to an investor by the host State is consistent with international law. This suggests 
that such concepts may indeed form part of the content of equity as “a general principle of 
law of civilized nations”, especially if widely shared among different legal systems. 
  
The paper surveys a range of actual transitional situations in order to articulate the various 
ways in which “odiousness” has been invoked by a successor regime as a ground for limiting 
its obligations to repay debt incurred by the previous regime. The paper also looks at some 
situations where other States’ tribunals have rejected or questioned claims of a transitional 
regime to adjust or sever debt obligations based on considerations of “odiousness”. 
Examination of these situations does not lead to skepticism concerning the legal grounds for 
a notion of “odious debt.” Usually, in the cases examined, there were doubts concerning the 
facts as to whether the debt in question was “odious” or actually conferred some benefits on 
the population or the new regime, or whether the transitional regime’s claim was based on 
an overly broad notion of “odiousness.” In none of these situations was a claim of odious 
debt rejected on grounds that international law simply does not countenance alteration in 
state-to-state debt obligations based on any equitable considerations whatsoever. The paper 
concludes that, due to the complexity and variety of transitional contexts, there is no single 
obvious legal forum for the adjudication or settlement of claims of odiousness. Depending on 
context, such claims might appropriately be raised in bilateral or multilateral negotiations 
on debt relief, or they could be adjudicated in the context of arbitration or domestic 
litigation. State-to-state debt contracts may specify a forum for the settlement of disputes. 
However, invocation of the concept of odious debt in multiple forums in respect of diverse 
debt contracts involving the same debtor State risks inconsistent decisions. Here, the 
examination of considerations of odiousness by a single special transitional tribunal seized 
with all the claims related to the political transition in question may be an attractive solution. 2 
INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
The concept of “odious debts” has taken on a growing legal and political significance in the early 
21st century. Since the post-colonial era, and continuing in recent years, a large number of 
political regime changes have occurred, whether due to war, revolution, secession, or the peaceful 
evolution of societies from one form of Government to another. Such transitions pervasively raise 
issues of the continuity of legal obligations from the old regime to the new, including the 
disposition of debt obligations acquired by the previous regime.  
 
The odious debt concept seeks to provide a moral and legal foundation for severing, in whole or 
in part, the continuity of legal obligations where the debt in question was contracted by a prior 
“odious” regime and was used in ways that were not beneficial or were harmful to the interests of 
the population. Usually, it also has been pertinent to the concept to establish whether or not the 
creditor knew or should have known of these circumstances at the time the debt was contracted. 
 
The relevance of the odious debt concept to political transitions is both distinct from and related 
to the debate on whether, as a matter of law or policy, international financial institutions or other 
potential creditors should ex ante be prevented or deterred from lending to existing regimes that 
are declared “odious”. This is a point associated with the issue of lending conditionality. This 
discussion paper examines the odious debt doctrine largely in the context of selected, relevant 
past or ongoing political transitions; the possibility of ex ante declaration of debt as “odious” is 
however discussed briefly in chapter V in relation to private and governmental creditors.  
 
 
I. DEFINITION OF THE ODIOUS DEBT CONCEPT 
 
The modern concept of odious debts was first articulated in the post-World War I context, by the 
jurist Alexander Nahun Sack, in his 1927 book The Effects of State Transformations on their 
Public Debts and Other Financial Obligations. For Sack, odious debts were debts contracted and 
spent against the interests of the population of a State, without its consent, and with full 
awareness of the creditor. Sack (1929) wrote as follows: 
 
“…if a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the 
State, but to strengthen its despotic regime, to repress its population that fights 
against it, etc., this debt is odious for the population of the State. 
 
“The debt is not an obligation for the nation; it is a regime’s debt, a personal debt 
of the power that has incurred it, consequently it falls within this power….The 
reason these ‘odious’ debts cannot be considered to encumber the territory of the 
State, is that such debts do not fulfill one of the conditions that determines the 
legality of the debts of the State, that is: the debts of the State must be incurred 
and the funds from it employed for the needs and in the interest of the State. 
‘Odious’ debts, incurred and used for ends which, to the knowledge of the 
creditors, are contrary to the interests of the nation, do not compromise the latter 
– in the case that the nation succeeds in getting rid of the Government which 
incurs them – except to the extent that real advantages were obtained from these 
debts.” 
 
Sack divided odious debts into several categories: war debts, subjugated or imposed debts, and 
regime debts. Other jurists have used slightly different taxonomies. O’Connell (1967) referred to    3  
“hostile debts” in addition to war debt; others have referred to “profligate debts”. Still others refer 
to a new category of “developing world debts not spent in the interests of the population” framing 
the concept in terms of irresponsible or odious lending (Khalfan et al., 2003).
1  
 
The most common classical types of odious debts are hostile debts and war debts. “Hostile debts” 
can be defined as debts incurred to suppress secessionist movements, to conquer peoples and so 
forth. “War debts” are debts contracted by the State for the purpose of funding a war which the 
State eventually loses and whereby the victor is not obliged to repay the debt.  
 
￿In the context of the negotiation of the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in 
Respect of Matters other than Treaties (still not ratified) Mohammed Bedjaoui
2, Special 
Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, concluded that “odious debt” is an umbrella 
term covering a range of specific debts – war debts and subjugated or imposed debts being but 
two examples. He clarified the situation as follows: 
 
(a) From the standpoint of the successor State, an odious debt can be taken to mean a state 
debt contracted by the predecessor State to serve purposes contrary to the major 
interests of either the successor State or the territory that is transferred to it; 
 
(b) From the standpoint of the international community, an odious debt could be taken to 
mean any debt contracted for purposes that are not in conformity with contemporary 
international law and, in particular, the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations.
3 
 
Sack believed that state practice was such that the doctrine of odious debts could be said to be 
part of positive international law – a generally accepted rule of law. However, to avoid 
opportunistic use of the doctrine in inappropriate situations, Sack (1929: 163) proposed a process 
for the practical application of the doctrine that would be fair to all parties: 
 
“(1) The new Government would have to prove and an international tribunal 
would have to ascertain the following: 
 
“(a) That the needs which the former Government claimed in order to 
contract the debt in question, were odious and clearly in contradiction to 
the interests of the people of the entirety of the former State or a part 
thereof, and 
“(b) That the creditors, at the moment of paying out the loan, were aware 
of its odious purpose.  
 
“(2) Upon establishment of these two points, the creditors must then prove that 
the funds for this loan were not utilized for odious purposes – harming the people 
of the entire State or part of it – but for general or specific purposes of the State 
which do not have the character of being odious.” 
 
                                                 
1 See also the discussion of illegitimate debt in New Economics Foundation, Odious Lending: Debt Relief 
As If Morals Mattered, (2005): illegal debt, onerous debt, odious debt, unsustainable debt, moral debt, 
environmental debt, historical debt. 
2 Currently a member of the International Court of Justice. 
3 Ninth Report on the Succession of States in Respect of Matters other than Treaties, 1977 Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, Vol. 2 (Part 1): 68 and 70. 4 
The above formulation does not appear to require that the creditors be aware of how in fact the 
funds were actually spent. Nevertheless, subsequent jurists, notably O’Connell (1967: 459), treat 
this aspect as implicit in Sack’s formulation.  
 
 
II. NORMATIVE SOURCES OF THE ODIOUS DEBT CONCEPT 
 
Like many concepts in international law, the concept of odious debt has been shaped by multiple 
normative sources: formal concepts of sovereignty and statehood have been influential and so 
have notions of political justice and accountability, as well as ideas of fair dealing and equity in 
contractual relations. In recent and contemporary treatments of odious debt, human rights 
elements have attained importance – as they have more generally in thinking about problems of 
transitional justice (Teitel, 2003). 
 
However, to understand properly the normative foundations of the concept of odious debt, it is 
necessary to bear in mind that it constitutes a limitation on the international legal obligation to 
repay state-to-state debts. This obligation has generally been articulated as based on the notion of 
pacta sunt servanda, the requirement that States honour their agreements with one another. 
However, the concept of pacta sunt servanda concerns treaties, that is to say, state-to-state 
agreements that evidence the intent of the States in question to be bound in international law. 
When States enter into loan contracts with other States, do they intend that the obligations in 
question be international law obligations, private law obligations or both? The limitation of the 
pacta sunt servanda concept for settling the issue of continuity of debt obligations became clear 
early on when both theorists and state practitioners grappled with the problem of state succession.  
 
Generally speaking, when state succession occurs, whether through dismemberment (the case of 
the Soviet Union), succession or some other change that alters the nature of the sovereign itself, 
international legal obligations are not thought to be automatically transferred to the new State or 
States. As a formal matter, the identity of the sovereign itself has changed and the new sovereign 
has not expressed its will to be bound. Applying these formal conceptions of the limits of 
international legal obligation where sovereignty changes to the case of state-to-state debts was 
quickly understood to be problematic. Firstly, as a practical matter, it could lead to financial 
instability and uncertainty in the case of this kind of transition. Secondly, it could entail unjust 
enrichment, to the extent that the new State would benefit from the loans or their effects (such as 
public infrastructure) without providing compensation for those benefits. Thus, the notion of 
“maintenance” of debt obligations in the case of succession arose as a sort of exception to the 
notion that change of “statehood” itself does not entail an automatic transfer of the legal 
obligations of the former sovereign to the new State(s). 
 
There have been attempts to eliminate “maintenance” as a general rule in the case of newly 
independent States; however, these attempts have never gained the support of most developed 
States. The 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties and the 1983 
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts 
include a provision referred to as the “clean slate rule”(Abrahams, 2000). Article 16 of the 1978 
Convention provides that “a newly independent State is not bound to maintain in force or to 
become party to, any treaty by reason only of the fact that at the date of the succession of States 
the treaty was in force in respect of the territory to which the succession of States relates.” More 
pertinently, Article 38 of the 1983 Convention provides as follows: 
    5  
“(1) When the successor State is a newly independent State, no state debt of the 
predecessor State shall pass to the newly independent State, unless an agreement 
between them provides otherwise in view of the link between the state debt of the 
predecessor State connected with its activity in the territory to which the 
succession of States relates and the property, rights and interests which pass to 
the newly independent State. 
 
“(2) The agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall not infringe on the principle 
of the permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural 
resources, nor shall its implementation endanger the fundamental economic 
equilibria of the newly independent State.”
4 
 
One commentator argues that by establishing a presumption that newly independent States do not 
inherit any debt, the Convention gives little incentive to enter into an agreement to take on any of 
the debt of their predecessors. Perhaps this helps to explain why so few developed States have 
adhered to the Property Convention (Khalfan et al., 2003: 34).  
 
Abrahams (2000) argues that there exists an important link between these two “clean slate” 
articles and “odious debts”. The International Law Commission, in dealing with the question of 
“odious debts”, adopted the approach that it would first “examine each particular type of 
succession of States, because the rule to be formulated might well settle the issue and dispose of 
the need to draft general provisions on the matter” (Bedjaoui: 67). Abrahams believes that it was 
clearly intended that the question of odious debt be addressed in the context of the rules relating 
to the succession of newly independent States. “Thus, inherent in the ‘clean slate rule’ is the 
rationale that debts of a predecessor State might be ‘odious’ and for that reason States should be 
able to invoke the said rule within the contexts of Articles 16 and 38 of the two Conventions 
respectively” (Abrahams, 2000). 
 
The notion of “maintenance” has, in any case, underpinned for centuries the practice of 
negotiated transfer of state debts in the case of succession. At the same time, other political, 
economic and legal considerations also have shaped such negotiations, leading to settlements that 
in a range of cases resulted in partial cancellation or (rarely) complete cancellation of some debts. 
The legal considerations have included considerations of justice or equity. One example is that 
apportionment of debt between several new States that are the successor of a single now-defunct 
State has to take into consideration the relative benefit from the lending that flows to each of 
these successor States, not just considerations of relative gross domestic product, population or 
territory. Consideration of the “odiousness” of a particular debt is another example. 
 
Equity and justice have been brought into the disposition of debt in the case of succession 
because, both within the main private law systems of the world and in public international law, 
they have been long recognized as limits or qualifications to legal obligation – albeit limits that 
typically are not expressed as “rules”, but rather as modifications or adjustments to rules in 
individual cases. 
 
Thus, Grotius (1625) held that contracts made by the sovereign that are of no advantage and 
harmful to the State should not be honoured, and in particular where public money has been 
pledged for purposes that are not for the public good. Similarly, Grotius held that contracts made 
                                                 
4 Note that Article 38 has been critiqued for not dealing with situations in which the creditors of the 
successor State may be private creditors of another State. See M. Bedjaoui, 13
th Report on Succession of 
States in Respect of Matters Other than Treaties, para. 127. 6 
by a usurper regime that has overthrown a legitimate regime should not be honoured when the 
usurper has been removed.  
 
Among the sources of international law recognized in Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice are “the general principles of law of civilized nations”. These are principles 
common to a wide range of the world’s legal systems. Equitable limits to contractual obligations 
in such systems have included illegality, fraud, fundamentally changed circumstances, knowledge 
that an agent is not properly acting on behalf of the contracting principal and duress. Equitable 
considerations have frequently been explicitly applied by international tribunals in determining 
the reasonable and fair contours or limits of international legal obligations (Lowe, 1992 and 
Friedmann, 1964). 
 
As will be shown, the concept of odious debt is really a regrouping of a range of such equitable 
considerations as applied to particular transitional contexts. Not all of these contexts pertain to 
state succession: in fact, the challenges of political transition are often the same whether state 
succession in the formal sense of an alteration of abstract sovereignty is involved or not. 
 
While general principles to be discerned from the limits of contractual obligation in domestic 
legal systems are one source of equity or justice, it would be odd if the evolving normative 
content of international law itself were not also to be such a source. In the case of those 
international agreements that are treaties,
5 the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires 
that the obligations in any one agreement be read in light of other binding agreements as well “as 
any relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties.” This certainly includes 
elements of human rights law that have become custom (or even preemptory norms). Domestic 
and international practice since the Second World War increasingly evokes accountability for 
human rights abuses – especially crimes against humanity – as a high priority for the international 
system. In the current era of international law, such accountability extends beyond the state actors 
most directly involved in the context of the abuses to private actors and even corporations, 
including various decrees of complicity or facilitation of such wrongful acts. 
 
In the context of state indebtedness to private creditors, debt contracts are typically based on a 
chosen domestic system of law, specified in a choice of law clause in the contract. Here, also, the 
relevance of the notion of odious debt has not been explicitly elaborated on in the literature. Does 
an odious debt doctrine impose, as a matter of state responsibility in international law, an 
obligation on States to ensure that odious debts are not enforced in their domestic legal systems? 
Or does it simply add to the considerations that courts in most domestic legal systems would 
weigh in determining the limits of freedom of contract (illegality, fraud, changed circumstances, 
ostensible authority of the agent to contract, public policy, etc.)?  
 
In the case of state contracts with private creditors, Sornarajah (2004: 419–427) has pointed out 
that, despite frequent incantations to that effect by commentators and creditors, there is no 
evidence of general international law establishing the sanctity of such contracts. Certainly, in 
some circumstances, repudiation of a contract with a foreign investor might violate the customary 
international law of state responsibility for treatment of aliens (the fair and equitable treatment 
standard, which is also incorporated into many bilateral investment treaties and trade 
agreements). But such a standard itself depends on notions of justice and equity, and therefore 
would imply the relevance of considerations such as the odiousness of the debt. 
 
                                                 
5 Treaties are binding as a matter of international law and the doctrine of “maintenance” in effect 
turns State-to-State debt agreements into treaties.    7  
A skeptical view of the doctrine of odious debt may hold that there is inadequate state practice 
and certainly lack of opinio juris to establish an obligation to make odious debt obligations 
unenforceable in domestic legal systems. But the concept of odious debt obligations can 
nevertheless make a distinctive contribution to the application of domestic law doctrines limiting 
contractual obligation by incorporating sensitivity to the contemporary demands of transitional 
justice as well as global justice in the broadest sense. More critical views of the odious debt 
concept show concern that it does not yield ex ante certainty concerning the situations in which 
debt will be considered odious, depending instead on case-by-case application of quite general 
legal standards to controversial matters. Yet the common law of contracts has functioned 
effectively as a default for transactions in financial markets for hundreds of years. This is despite 
having evolved case by case through judicial application of general norms and concepts in widely 
varying circumstances. There is a rich case law in the common law world concerning the limits of 
contractual freedom, whereby contractual obligations have been found unenforceable or partly 
enforceable. Generally speaking, these limits have not prevented the growth of sophisticated and 
well-functioning financial markets. 
 
 
III. THE CONCEPT OF ODIOUS DEBT AS A BRANCH OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF  
  TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
 
The idea of odious debt is often discussed in the abstract from the political and institutional 
context. The notion of “repudiation” of debt is in itself inadequate to capture the complex 
possibilities of how and where a “doctrine” of odious debt might be invoked, especially given the 
critical importance of the transitional context concerned.  
 
 First of all, in the case of state-to-state debt, the notion of odious debt might be invoked against a 
claim that there is an international law obligation to repay the debt. Such a claim might in theory 
be invoked in state-to-state arbitration or even in the International Court of Justice, but in practice 
it is much more likely to be voiced in political or diplomatic discussions and negotiations in the 
context of political transition in the debtor country. Or alternatively, odious debt could be a 
concept applied by a specialized tribunal seized with addressing legal issues of transition. From 
this perspective, the concept of odious debt, rather than a self-standing legal doctrine, might be 
regarded as a lex specialis of transitional justice, a form of justice that is inherently and 
pervasively political and legal as well as highly contextualized in its specific content. Cheng 
(2007), for example, rejects the odious debt doctrine based on the notion that outcomes in 
international relations must either be fully determined by legal rules or decided by 
political bargaining in the absence of legal rules; he rightly sees the importance of 
pragmatic considerations of economic and financial stability in transitional situations but 
sees a legal approach as at odds with the taking account of those considerations.
6 
However, critiques of the “doctrine” of odious debt concerned with the inherent indeterminacy of 
concepts such as the odiousness of a regime, or with the need to balance considerations of 
odiousness with political and economic concerns such as future access to capital markets and the 
need for economic and financial market stability in a transitional situation, may miss the point.
7  
                                                 
6 See the work of Teitel, who identified this phenomenon, coining the expression and developing the 
concept of “transitional justice” (Teitel, 2000). 
7 This bifurcation of law and politics seems to ignore one of the central insights of modern legal 
scholarship, derived from the work of economist Ronald Coase: at least in a world where transaction costs 
are greater than zero, bargains are always struck in the shadow of the law, and conversely, actual outcomes 8 
 
The odious debt concept does not create an obligation in all circumstances to repudiate the debt in 
question. Instead, when the creditor chooses to invoke the doctrine, it can provide one kind of 
normative and legal foundation for a transitional solution that includes debt reduction. For 
example, it is not inconsistent with the concept of odious debt that this transitional solution 
includes partial repayment of such debt. In some transitional situations, the best option for 
reasons of economic and financial stability could be to continue to pay all debt, even if it is 
odious.  
 
Cheng suggests that the odious debt concept somehow would require that a debtor assert the non-
enforcement of all the debt in question.
8 However, in reality, rather than repudiating debt, a 
debtor State might invoke concerns of odious debt in negotiations with its creditors in order to 
reach compromise that promotes financial stability and future access to credit. Parties often hold 
back from the exercise of their full legal rights and obligations for pragmatic reasons, including 
reputation effects and an interest in maintaining relationships. This does not mean that the rights 
and obligations are lesser or that their existence does not have an important bearing on the 
negotiated outcome. It would be mistaken to invoke cases where the debt was arguably odious but 
the outcome was adjustment not elimination of obligations to show that state practice does not 
support the existence of an odious debt concept as customary international law. Transitional (or 
successor) regimes may, in some contexts, give amnesties and pardons to human rights violators 
in the previous regime where this is desirable for purposes of reconciliation and building a 
successful democracy (Teitel, 2003). Similarly, transitional regimes may also decide to continue 
relationships with financial institutions that had odious dealings with the previous regime when 
the economic and financial stability of the transition suggests such a course of action. 
 
Moreover, in terms of accountability for past injustices and abuses, a transitional State may 
decide to examine the actions of the international financial community in the context of a truth 
commission, such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. A transitional 
State may decide that repudiation of debt is not the only way of addressing its connection to a 
legacy of oppression. Willingness to admit complicity in “odiousness” and to make amends 
through new lending or even apologies may in some cases satisfy a transitional regime’s concern 
for accountability about the past. 
 
At the same time, it is not fatal to the concept of odious debt that, in state practice, one rarely sees 
all the considerations or aspects of transitional justice in debt obligation that have been regrouped 
under the notion of odious debt operating in the same situation. Cheng, rather like Gelpern, seeks 
to explain away state practice supporting the relevance of odiousness to the obligation to repay by 
suggesting that practice with respect to war debts and decolonization is irrelevant to odiousness. 
The normative considerations, according to Cheng, are entirely different (Cheng, 2007). 
However, one of the central considerations with respect to war debts is that the debt cannot be 
considered as beneficial to the postwar successor State and its population, which is clearly one 
consideration that is involved in the determination of odiousness. Similarly, it is certainly the case 
                                                                                                                                                  
are not simply determined by the rules but by the bargains that parties negotiate in the shadow of the law 
(Cheng, 2007). 
8 Cheng sometimes assumes that the odiousness of the regime was the decisive and sufficient consideration 
for non-enforcement of debt under the odious debt doctrine; but, as we have seen, the doctrine involves not 
only considering the odiousness of the regime but that of the debt itself, including whether the debt has 
conferred in whole or in part some benefit on the population who must now bear it. The balancing of these 
various considerations may well entail a legal answer under the odious debt doctrine that involves the 
enforceability of some debts but not others.     9  
that the oppressive nature of the prewar or colonial regime has been a factor in justifying a refusal 
to pay war debts or debts incurred in colonial situations, and this of course also highlights another 
aspect of odiousness.  
 
Therefore, a review of a large number of such instances might well conclude that in different 
transitional situations, certain normative considerations may be more important than others.  
 
state actors are not typically seeking to articulate a doctrine in the abstract, but rather are seeking 
to solve a particular problem or dispute using a conception of the equitable limits of sanctity of 
contract in transitional situations and to articulate the contours of those limits for that particular 
situation. Therefore, they may well only refer to the facet of odiousness that is most salient to the 
situation in question. Some scholars supporting the odious debt concept (such as Sack) may have 
attempted to articulate the doctrine as a set of strict conditions that must be present in every 
instance in order to justify the non-enforcement of debt. However, state practice is more 
supportive of the notion that one or more of the normative considerations usually described as 
odiousness have been present in decisions concerning enforceability of debt in a wide variety of 
historical eras and across a wide range of transitional situations. 
 
The fact that a wide range of legal and political considerations is relevant in determining the 
continuity of debt obligations in contexts of transition may explain in part the failure of States to 
agree on the expression of the notion of “odious debt” as a general rule that would determine the 
fate of state debt obligations regardless of the transitional context. One effort to establish such a 
general rule is represented by a proposal in respect of the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession 
of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, the only international convention that 
relates to the subject of debt repayment. The International Law Commission Draft defined odious 
debts as: “(a) all debts contracted by the predecessor State with a view to attaining objectives 
contrary to the major interests of the successor State or of the transferred territory; (b) all debts 
contracted by the predecessor State with an aim and for a purpose not in conformity with 
international law embodied in Charter of the United Nations” (Wood, 1980). This definition was 
ultimately not included in the final text of the Convention, which has not yet come into force, not 
having achieved the requisite number of ratifications.  
 
According to King, the decision to exclude a reference in the convention to odious debts “has 
dual significance. On the one hand, it indicates some juristic acceptance of the importance of the 
doctrine, while on the other hand, it illustrates the reluctance of both States and perhaps the 
Commission itself to include the doctrine explicitly” (Khalfan et al., 2003: 33). 
 
Meanwhile, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reassessed the strict international 
law principle of pacta sunt servanda (Frankenberg and Knieper, 1984). Article 62 provides that a 
termination or suspension of provisions in a treaty could arise from a substantive change in 
circumstances – an appeal on the basis of clausula rebus sic stantibus. The change in 
circumstances must present a substantial basis for the consent of the parties and the change in 
circumstances must radically alter the extent of contractual obligations yet to be fulfilled. In 
addition, Articles 49 and 50 reflect an emerging body of international law in respect of fraud and 
corruption of a representative of a State. This is not tailored to the situation of debtors but it does 
challenge the sanctity of treaties (Khalfan et al., 2003: note 1). According to King, had the 
Conventions been codified today, a greater opinio juris may have emerged with respect to the 
issue of odious debt (Khalfan et al., 2003: note 1: 33). Global affairs have evolved in the 
intervening years, placing much more emphasis on the advancement of human rights and the 
importance of humanitarian considerations in international financial practice. 
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IV. KEY TRANSITIONAL CONTEXTS WHERE THE CONCEPT OF ODIOUS DEBT  
    HAS BEEN INVOKED 
 
Annexation of the Republic of Texas 
 
In 1844, the United States annexed the Republic of Texas. Despite provisions to the contrary in 
the treaty of union which the Senate failed to ratify, the United States initially refused to pay all 
pre-annexation debts, but paid the majority of the debt on a pro rata basis in 1855. Hoeflich 
(1982) suggests that the federal Government’s approach was confused, in the end placing more 
emphasis on equitable arguments to do what was “right” and “just” in the circumstances.  
 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified on 
9 July 1868. The Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as follows:  
 
￿“The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebelling, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall 
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against 
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such 
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.” 
 
The main purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was of course was to ensure the repudiation 
of secession and to abolish slavery, and the other sections of the Amendment are much more 
historically significant. 
 
The Fourth Section considers that debts of the Confederacy not collected before the end of the 
Civil War were null and void. This was to punish those who had helped the Confederacy. The 
federal Government did, however, pay all the insurance debts – those debts attributable to the 
destruction of homes and crops by Union soldiers – even though those debts were the 
responsibility of the State to the people of that State. This meant that the insurrectionist States 
were indebted to the United States Government, making it easier to rebuild their States from the 
devastation caused by the war. In order to be readmitted to the Union, Southern States were 
required to ratify the amendment. 
 
United States refusal to assume Cuban debt – 1898 Paris Conference 
 
In 1898, after the Spanish–American War, Spain ceded the United States sovereignty over Cuba, 
the Philippines, Puerto Rico and certain territories. The Americans refused to assume certain debt 
owed by Spain, secured by revenues of Cuba. The American Commissioners argued as follows 
(Moore, 1906):  
 
(a) The loan was not contracted for the benefit of Cubans, indeed some of the funds had 
been used to suppress popular uprisings in Cuba and to reincorporate Santo Domingo 
into the Spanish Dominions. The loans were hostile to the people required to pay them.  
(b) Cuba had not consented to the debts. 
(c) The creditors knew that the pledge of Cuban revenues to secure the loans had been 
given in the context of efforts to suppress a struggle for freedom from the Spanish rule.    11 
Therefore the creditors “took their obvious chances of their investment on so 
precarious a security.” 
 
Spain made the classic arguments based on a narrow legal interpretation of the international law 
governing succession that the United States was bound notwithstanding the circumstances 
surrounding the use of the loan. According to the Spanish Commissioners: “It is perfectly self-
evident that if, during the period intervening between the assumption by a sovereign of an 
obligation and the fulfillment of the same, he shall cease to be bound thereby through 
relinquishment or any other lawful conveyance, the outstanding obligation passes as an integral 
part of the sovereignty itself to him who succeeds him” (Moore, 1906). In the end, neither Cuba 
nor the United States assumed these debts in the Treaty of Paris, although Spain never abandoned 
its position in the matter. 
 
Insofar as the United States Commissioners explicitly referred to the Cuban debt as “odious”, this 
is arguably the first direct application of the doctrine of odious debt. It is of course mentioned by 
Sack, whereas O’Connell classifies the Cuban debt controversy as a hostile debt situation. 
However, Bedjaoui refers to “subjugation debts” or “debts contracted by a State with a view to 
attempting to repress an insurrectionary movement or war of liberation in a territory that it 
dominates or seeks to dominate, or to strengthen its economic colonization of that territory” 
(Bedjaoui: 72). 
 
Soviet repudiation of Tsarist debts 
 
After the Revolution of 1917, the Provisional Soviet Government initially agreed to repay the 
outstanding debt of the Tsarist Government. However, by 1918, the Soviet Government had 
repudiated the debt. Sack, who himself was a former minister in the Tsarist regime, notes a 
particular Soviet doctrine that regards acts of previous Governments as incurring personal 
obligations only, and not ones that bind the State (Sack, 1929: 68). Nevertheless even for Sack, it 
could be argued that the repudiated debts were “odious” and therefore were unenforceable against 
the successor regime, given the evidence that Tsarist Russia did not rule in the interests of its 
population (Sack, 1929: 157). 
 
Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and Polish debts 
 
Article 254 of the Treaty of Versailles exempted Poland from the apportionments of those debts 
which “in the opinion of the Reparation Commission are attributable to the measures taken by the 
German and Prussian Governments for the German colonization of Poland”  (O’Connell, 
1967: 189). Article 254 then set out the manner in which German public debts contracted prior to 
1 August 1 1914 were assumed by successor States. O’Connell and others agreed that the Treaty 
of Versailles effectively applied the odious debt test used by the American Commissioners in the 
Cuban debt controversy.  
 
Tinoco arbitration – 1923 (Great Britain and Costa Rica 1923)  
 
In 1922, Costa Rica refused to honour loans made by the Royal Bank of Canada to the former 
dictator Federico Tinoco. This is an example of state practice with respect to a change of 
Government and not state succession. It is also an example of an instance where the issue of 
odiousness of the debt became salient in a claim espoused on behalf of a private creditor. 
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In 1917, Federico Tinoco overthrew the Government of Costa Rica and later held an election to 
ratify the “revolution”. During the summer of 1919, the Banco Internacional de Costa Rica issued 
several “bills” of credit to the Royal Bank of Canada, in respect of which the Royal Bank paid 
several cheques drawn by the Tinoco Government. The money was used personally by Tinoco 
and his brother and for no public purpose. By August 1919, Tinoco and his brother had left the 
country and the Government fell in September. The restored Government of Costa Rica enacted a 
law which invalidated all transactions between the State and the holders of the “bills” issued by 
the Banco Internacional.  
 
Chief Justice William Howard Taft was the sole arbitrator for the dispute. Taft agreed that the 
Tinoco Government was a de facto Government capable of binding the State to international 
obligations. Despite this, Taft emphasized the fact that the debt in question did not create a valid 
public debt, nor was it in the public interest. The evidence established that the funds were used for 
the personal enrichment of the Tinoco brothers and that the bank was aware of this, since the 
transactions “were made at a time when the popularity of the Tinoco Government had 
disappeared, and when the political and military movement aiming at the overthrow of that 
Government was gaining strength” (Great Britain and Costa Rica 1923: 176). Taft required 
the Royal Bank to discharge the burden of proving that the Costa Rican Governments had used 
the money for legitimate purposes, something which it could not do. Accordingly, Taft found that 
the legislation invalidating the transactions in question did not constitute an international wrong. 
 
Meron (1957) has a different take on the arbitration. He argues that Taft dismissed the claim of 
Great Britain on behalf of the Royal Bank of Canada because the contract was ultra vires the 
Constitution in force at the time. The contract contained provisions regarding taxes, and therefore 
to be valid required the approval of both Houses of Congress, not the Chamber of Deputies alone. 
 
It can be argued that the Tinoco arbitration establishes some authority for the existence of opinio 
juris with respect to the doctrine of odious debt. Taft’s judgment adopts a consistent approach 
confirming the rule on the non-transferability of “odious debts”.  
 
Buchheit et al. (2006) disagree, arguing that Tinoco should be narrowly interpreted as depending 
on the particular facts that the Tinocos appropriated the whole of the debt. The result might have 
been different had the debt only been partially odious (Buchheit et al., 2006). But this does not 
reduce the value of the Tinoco arbitration as a source of law on odious debt. The concept of 
odiousness of debt is sufficiently flexible to address situations where debt is only partly odious – 
for example, where part of the funds may have been used for legitimate purposes to benefit the 
population. In such a circumstance, and depending on the exact factual matrix, it might be 
appropriate to maintain that there is a continuing obligation, at least with respect to that part of 
the total amount that is non-odious. 
 
German repudiation of Austrian debts – 1938  
 
The Government Austria was heavily indebted to foreign creditors at the time of the German 
annexation of Austria in 1938, when loans from creditors had been expressly designed to prevent 
union with Germany. Germany repudiated the debt, citing prior American and British practice 
and arguing that it was contracted against the interests of the Austrian people (Hoeflich, 
1982: 63–64). To no avail, the Americans tried to argue that much of the debt had been used for 
the purchase of food.  
    13 
1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy 
 
The 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy incorporated the principle underlying Article 254 of the 1919 
Treaty of Versailles, whereby the Reparations Commission exempted Poland from those debts 
attributable to the measures taken by the Governments of Germany and Prussia from the German 
occupation of Poland. Under this treaty, the Franco–Italian Conciliation Commission ruled that 
“debts contracted by the ceding State for war purposes, or for the purpose of expanding a territory 
which was first annexed and subsequently liberated, cannot bind the successor or restored State. 
The ruling drew a parallel with the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, considering it inconceivable 
that Ethiopia should have to assume the burden of expenses incurred by Italy in order to ensure its 




Advocates of repudiation of debt incurred by the apartheid South African regime argue that 
apartheid was the equivalent of a racial dictatorship, condemned as such by the international 
community for many years. South Africa was forced to leave the Commonwealth in 1961. In 
1973, the United Nations called apartheid a crime against humanity. The struggle of the South 
African people was recognized as a struggle for national liberation. In 1977, the United Nations 
imposed a mandatory arms embargo and in 1985 the United Nations Security Council imposed 
trade sanctions on the apartheid regime. Despite this, the regime continued to borrow from private 
banks throughout the 1980s. In July 1985, the Government declared a state of emergency and on 
1 September South Africa defaulted and stopped paying its creditors. In order to accelerate the 
end of the regime, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, among others, called on the banks not to 
reschedule South Africa’s debts and advocated the confiscation of South African assets abroad 
instead. Nevertheless, a settlement was reached in 1987 with 14 major banks from Germany, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and France. 
 
After being elected president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress 
came under heavy pressure not to renounce apartheid debt (Hanlon, 2002). The new Government 
distanced itself from calls to nullify its apartheid-era debts. It was considered important not to 
default on debts in order to attract critical foreign investment. However, Hanlon (2002: 28) is 
typical of observers who argue that the promise of foreign investment has not been kept.  
 
“Foreign direct investment has been tiny – only two thirds of the profits 
repatriated by companies on investments they made in the apartheid State. And 
new lending has not kept up with repayments – over six years South Africa paid 
out $3.7 billion more than it received. Thus, promises have not been kept and 
policy advice was wrong. If South Africa had frozen profits on apartheid-era 
investments and simply repudiated the odious apartheid debt – or even if it had 
demanded a ten year moratorium – it would have been $10 billion better off. 
Foreign aid during this period was only $1.1 billion, so even if aid had been cut 
off, South Africa would have profited by $8.9 billion.” 
 
Meanwhile, on 12 November 2002, a suit was filed in the New York Eastern District Court for 
apartheid reparations against eight banks and 12 oil, transport, communications technology and 
armaments companies from Germany, Switzerland, Britain, the United States, the Netherlands 
and France. The suit was filed on behalf of the Khulumani Support Group, representing 32,000 
individual “victims of state-sanctioned torture, murder, rape, arbitrary detention and inhumane 14 
treatment”, by the Apartheid Debt and Reparations Campaign of Jubilee South Africa.
9 The suit 
was brought pursuant to the Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA) which allows any non-United States 
citizen to bring a claim for damages against any other person who has violated customary 
international law. 
 
The Government of South Africa continues to distance itself from the popular movement to 
cancel the apartheid debt. For example, its top ministers denounced the lawsuit seeking 
reparations from banks that loaned to the apartheid regime because “we are talking to those very 
companies named on the lawsuits about investing in post-apartheid South Africa.”
10 
 
Others argue that the United Nations Security Council should have gone farther in 1985 and 
declared that “it would not consider debt incurred by the apartheid Government as a legitimate 
obligation of any successor Government” (Jayachandran and Kremer, 2005). The private banks 
would not have been willing to make the loans that effectively kept South Africa afloat for a few 
more years. Similar action could have been taken after major shareholders forced the 
International Monetary Fund to cut all lending to the former President of Croatia, Franjo 
Tudjman, in 1997, after he was accused of resorting to political violence and appropriating public 
funds. However, in the absence of international action at the level of the United Nations Security 
Council, private commercial banks continued to lend Croatia a further $2 billion until Tudjman’s 
death in 1999. 
 
Arbitrations concerning Iranian debts owed to the United States 
 
These claims dated back to 1982, whereby the United States claimed to be owed a substantial 
amount of money pursuant to a contract dated 1948 relating to the purchase by Iran of certain 
World War II surplus military property. Among other things, the Islamic Republic of Iran denied 
any liability, claiming that the debts were odious debts. According to the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, the contracts were imposed by the United States and were “subjugation debts” of the prior 
regime. As such, they are “not transferable to the Islamic Republic of Iran”.
11 In concluding that 
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran could not invoke the “rule of odious debts”, the 
Iran–United States Claims Tribunal held that the original contract was not imposed on Iran. The 
Tribunal stated as follows:  
 
“50. In particular, it is not possible to establish any connection between the 
Contract and the crisis in Iran that led to the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. 
The Contract did not and in fact could not, in any respect detract from or 
undermine the new Constitution, the social order and the form of government of 
Iran as created in and after 1979. Also, the time gap is too considerable to allow 
for any such hypothesis. 
 
“51. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the debt under the 1948 Contract cannot 
be classified under the notion of ‘odious debts’ as understood in international 
law. They were not contracted with a view to attaining objectives contrary to the 
                                                 
9 http://www.cmht.com/casewatch/humanrights/aprtheid/html. See also About Africa Action, Africa Policy 
E-Journal, November 12, 2002 and other issues. 
10 “South Africa Shuns Apartheid Lawsuits”, Guardian, November 27, 2002. 
11 The United States of America v. The Islamic Republic of Iran (Case No. B36), Award No. 574-B36-2, 3 
December 1996), 32 Iran-United States C.T.R. 162 (1996):175–176.    15 
legitimate interests of Iran nor were they contracted with an aim and for a 
purpose not in conformity with international law”
12. 
 
The Tribunal was careful, however, to state that it was not taking any position on the status of the 
doctrinal debate over the concept of “odious debts” in international law:  
 
“In any event, the Tribunal will limit itself to stating that the said concept belongs 
to the realm of law of state succession. That law does not find application to the 
events in Iran. The revolutionary changes in Iran fall under the heading of state 
continuity, not state succession. This statement does not exclude a realist 
approach that recognizes that in practice the border between the concepts of 
continuity and succession is not always rigid.
13 In spite of the change in head of 
State and the system of government in 1979, Iran remained the same subject of 
international law as before the Islamic Revolution. For when a Government is 
removed through a revolution, the State, as an international person, remains 
unchanged and the new Government generally assumes all the previous 





Prior to the overthrow of the Government of Saddam Hussein, Iraq accumulated over $125 billion 
of unpaid debts. Several commentators have argued that since the debts were generated as a result 
of financing a dictatorship and military aggression (Adams 2004), they should be classified as 
odious and held to be unenforceable. Furthermore, a United States congressional initiative was 
introduced, following the overthrow of the Iraqi regime in 2003 to eliminate Iraqi odious debt. 
The bill was based on the notion that such debt not only impedes a successful rebuilding of post-
authoritarian States, but that the debts were never legitimate inheritances of the new Government 
due to the doctrine of odious debts (Jayachandran and Kremer, 2005). Senior officials of the 
United States Government have, on some occasions, evoked considerations of “odiousness” in 
arguing for the cancellation of Iraqi debt. Then Treasury Secretary John Snow referred to the 
notion that “the people of Iraq should not be saddled with those debts incurred through the regime 
of a dictator who has now gone.”
15 Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz emphasized in 
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee that much of the money borrowed by the 
Iraqi regime had been used “to buy weapons and to build palaces and to build instruments of 
oppression.”
16 Eventually, Iraqi debt relief was granted not with references to its legitimacy but 
instead for reasons of “debt sustainability”.  
 
Buchheit et al. (2006) criticize what they term an overly enthusiastic and indiscriminate 
application of the odious debt doctrine post-Iraq, and argue that commentators have gone far 
beyond Sack’s original loan-by-loan analysis, and are now simplistically content to label a regime 
                                                 
12 Ibid. The tribunal cited the definition of “odious debts” by Mohammed Bedjaoui, Ninth Report on 
Succession of States in respect of matters other than treaties, United Nations Doc. A/CN.4/301 and Add. 
1, paras. pp. 117–140, (1977) I.L.C. Yearbook, Vol. II, Part One, 45, pp. 67–70. 
13 Ibid., citing Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 82–85, (4
th ed., 1990). 
14 Ibid., p. 176, para. 54. 
15 Quoted in Joshua Craze, “Jubilee Iraq,” the LIP Magazine, available online at 
http://www.thelip.org/?p=93. 
16 Quoted in Nile Gardiner and Mark Miles, “Forgive the Iraqi Debt,” Executive Memorandum #871, 
Heritage Foundation, April 30 2003, available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/em871.cfm. 16 
“odious” and thereafter qualify all debt regardless of its provenance or use as “odious debt” 
(Buchheit et al., 2006: 22). These experts argue that successor global regimes should rely only on 
municipal courts of law to invalidate infamous debts of their predecessors on a case-by-case 
basis. Indeed, the Iraqi case could be seen as an example of a transitional situation (which 
continues to transition four years after the change of regime), in which invoking considerations of 
odiousness might make the task of obtaining relief more difficult or slower than the use of more 
evident and easily applicable criteria of economic sustainability.  
 
Norway’s ship export debt  
 
After an evaluation, the Government of Norway in 2006 determined that obligations arising out of 
lending to certain developing countries as part of the Ship Export Campaign of 1976–1980, and 
guaranteed through the Norwegian Institute for Export Credits, should be cancelled on grounds 
that Norway ought to share responsibility with the debtor countries for the failure of the 
programme as a development policy, given what were determined to be inadequate needs 
analyses and risk assessments. This is not an example of “odious debt” and indeed the 
Government stressed that the debt was not “illegitimate”. But the notion of co-responsibility 
exemplified by the unilateral and unconditional cancellation of these debts on 2 March 2007 does 




V. SELECTED ISSUES IN THE APPLICATION OF THE ODIOUS DEBT CONCEPT 
 
State succession versus government succession  
 
The original context in which the issue of odiousness of debt became salient was that of state 
succession, i.e. where the international legal personality of the State that contracted the debt has 
been eliminated or transformed.
17 It is fairly obvious that in cases of state succession, the issue of 
the future of debt obligations must be addressed, since the debtor as a legal person has ceased to 
exist. The fact that this has been the predominant traditional context in which the odiousness of 
debt has arisen as an issue has been interpreted in some instances as suggesting that the doctrine 
of odious debt applies only in cases of state succession and not other kinds of political transition, 
such as regime change. This was the assumption of the Iran Claims Tribunal, as noted above. 
However, strictly speaking, the Iran Claims Tribunal’s remark may be viewed as dicta since the 
Tribunal explicitly stated that it was not going to pronounce on the odious debt doctrine as a 
matter of law. Both O’Connell and Brownlie challenge the assumption that the odious debt 
doctrine is limited to state succession (Khalfan et al., 2003: 47). King points to the Tinoco 
arbitration as clearly establishing that the distinction between state succession and government 
succession should not be fatal to the odious debt doctrine, while Frankenberg et al. also note that 
the distinction is incongruous (Frankenberg and Knieper: 432). 
 
Although state succession and regime change raise different issues from the perspective of 
international legal personality, these differences nevertheless do not lessen the extent to which 
there are common normative challenges of transitional justice (Teitel Transitional Justice, supra). 
As discussed above, part of the confusion concerning the application of the odious debt doctrine 
to government succession arises from the way that some Governments have disclaimed debt they 
                                                 
17 An example of State succession would be the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia or Soviet Union and 
the establishment of several new States on the same territory.    17 
considered odious on the purported legal ground that government succession eliminates the 
obligation to repay. This is contrary to the default rule of continuity of legal obligations in 
government succession. But it does not follow that the rejection of such claims by the 
international community is a rejection of odiousness of debt as a basis for non-enforcement. It is 
instead a rejection of government succession per se or in itself as a basis for discharge of the 
obligation to repay. For example, the notion that a political revolution necessarily discharges the 
obligation to repay debt incurred by the previous regime has sometimes been advanced after 
regime change. Such a notion is certainly far too broad and in tension with the current default rule 
in international law that government succession does not alter or eliminate a State’s international 
obligations, i.e. government change does not change international legal personality.  
 
However, as a default rule, this doctrine is entirely consistent with the notion that considerations 
of odiousness of debt may affect the obligation to repay after a political transition that does not 
entail state succession. According to one expert, “When Chief Justice William Taft sat as 
arbitrator in Great Britain v. Costa Rica …he could not rely on the doctrine of odious debt 
because Costa Rica did not undergo state succession. Instead, Taft confirmed the international 
rule in existence at that time that government succession does not terminate preexisting state 
debts because the identity of the State is unchanged” (Cheng, 2007: 20–21).
18 On the other hand, 
Taft’s opinion could be interpreted differently: it was precisely because the default rule was that 
government succession does not terminate preexisting state debts that Taft went on to consider 
whether, despite that default rule, odiousness might nevertheless be a basis for non-enforcement; 
and Taft’s answer was yes. 
 
Creditor knowledge of odiousness 
 
In recent articulations of the concept of odious debt, one of the conditions for the characterization 
of debt as odious and eligible for repudiation is that the creditor at the time at which the loan 
contract was made knew, or should have known, that the debt was odious, i.e. that the funds were 
intended for a purpose contrary to the interests of the population. Proving subjective knowledge 
of this kind is in many instances a difficult proposition, although in some cases the likelihood of 
such knowledge is virtually obvious (Tinoco). Short of actual subjective knowledge, the notion 
that the lender ought to have known the intent of the debtor raises the issue of the nature and 
extent of the burden imposed on creditors to take positive steps to inform themselves of the 
purposes of the loan, and to assess the credibility of assertions of borrower state officials in that 
respect.  
 
There are no obvious international legal rules that establish an appropriate standard for creditor 
behaviour in this respect: however, as noted in chapter III of this study, the general principles of 
law of “civilized nations” are a valid source of international law, and are drawn from the common 
repository of the world’s main legal systems. Along these lines, notions of responsibility in 
contractual negotiations from domestic legal contexts may acquire the status of general principles 
and fill the gap in international legal material.  
 
For example, in some domestic legal systems and in some circumstances, agency law places a 
duty of diligence on a third party or creditor in ascertaining whether an agent (the debtor State) is 
exceeding its authority. This agent only has authority to act for the benefit of his principal (the 
population) to which it owes a fiduciary duty.
19 The very power of making binding commitments 
                                                 
18 This case (the Tinoco arbitration) is discussed above in some detail. 
19 Buchheit et al. (2006) citing ReStatement (Second) of Agency para 312, and (Third) Draft No.4 (2003) 
215. 18 
on behalf of another is considered to carry with it special responsibility for acting in the interests 
of that person. 
 
Based on the agency concept, a regime’s reputation for exploiting and oppressing its own people 
may place on the lender a higher burden to satisfy itself that the proceeds of the borrowing are 
benefiting the principal (the country) and not just the agent. The legal analysis allowing for the 
piercing of the corporate veil on situations of abuse by a controlling shareholder, can also be 
adapted to the legal analysis of sovereign States. A court may be able to fashion a remedy to 
allow a creditor to recover from an abusing shareholder in the corporate context, or a State to 
avoid debts contracted by a collusive lender and corrupt government officials in the sovereign 
context. 
 
Even if a loan is assigned to a third party who had no knowledge of, for example, corruption or 
bribery contrary to the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977, the law relating to the 
assignment of contractual rights provides that the borrower can raise the same defences against 
the assignee. The assignee never gets a better right than the assignor had.  
 
In general, the domestic law of contract may provide ample room for a judge or adjudicator to 
balance the equities in a case involving illegal behavior of one or more of the parties to the 
transaction. Examples include applying the principle of unjust enrichment (one cannot receive a 
benefit at another’s expense without conferring a reciprocal benefit), abuse of rights
20 (one cannot 
exercise one’s rights in an excessive or abusive manner, such that it harms the rights of others), 
restitution, etc. 
 
Note that the domestic law principle of in pari delicto will also be applied to a plaintiff 
complaining of illegal conduct who does not have clean hands. In Adler v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria,
21 the plaintiff was barred from recovering any of the money lost in a financial scam, even 
though the court acknowledged the fraud and that the criminals would receive a windfall. The 
Ninth Circuit stated that: “[P]ublic policy favors discouraging frauds such as the one perpetrated 
on Adler, but it also favors discouraging individuals such as Adler from voluntarily participating 
in such schemes and paying bribes to bring them to fruition”.
22 Domestic private law systems may 
also be a source of principles where there is subjective awareness of creditors (Khalfan et al., 
2003). The standard can be actual guiding knowledge, willfully ignoring the obvious, and 
willfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable person would 
make. 
 
The fungibility of debt 
 
The concept of odious debt, where applied on a case-by-case or loan-by-loan basis, depends on 
the notion that a particular loan was used for a purpose contrary to the interests of the people of 
the sovereign in question. However, it is clearly arguable that loans that are used for a non-odious 
purpose may indirectly contribute to odious purposes, in that the sovereign is enabled to free 
other funds that would otherwise be needed for non-odious purposes and put them to odious 
purposes. There is thus a conceptual argument for declaring “odious” a proportion of all loans to 
an oppressive regime that was spending money on odious purposes, whether or not a connection 
can be established between any particular loan and an odious purpose. Such an approach almost 
necessarily implies a political action, either unilateral or negotiated, rather than a case-by-case 
                                                 
20 There is some authority for the notion that abuse of rights is a general principle of law. 
21 219 F.3d 869 (9
th Cir. 2000). 
22 Ibid., p.877.    19 
litigation of individual loan contracts. Moreover, whether, in the absence of the loan(s) in 
question, an oppressive regime would have chosen to spend other available funds on non-odious 
rather than odious purposes is, of course, a counterfactual that is very difficult to prove as a fact 
in a litigation context. Oppressive regimes often will avoid what would appear to be even the 
most essential spending on legitimate public purposes in order to deploy funds to oppressive 
goals or purposes contrary to international law. 
 
State-to-state debt vs. state debt to private creditors 
 
The odious debt concept has emerged primarily as a limitation on the international law obligation 
of maintenance of debt obligations in the case of State, arguably also, government succession. As 
noted in chapter III above, there is no comparable general international law obligation to maintain 
debt obligations to private creditors in the case of such political transitions, simply because 
performance of contracts with aliens who are private parties is not an international law obligation 
as such (Reinisch, 1995). Nevertheless, there are some situations where the repudiation of 
contractual obligations to private creditors may constitute a violation of international law. These 
could include situations where the repudiation of obligations under a loan contract is analogous to 
expropriation of property, or where the repudiation is discriminatory or arbitrary (ibid.: 93). It 
has also been argued that, where the repudiating State gains a genuine benefit from the funds in 
question, an internationally wrongful unjust enrichment may be present. This is based on the 
notion that restitution for unjust enrichment has become a general principle of law (Meron, 1957: 
277). 
 
As the Tinoco arbitration illustrates, the equitable considerations underlying the concept of odious 
debt can constitute a powerful defense against claims that failure to honour the contractual rights 
of an alien violates the minimum standard of treatment in the customary international law of state 
responsibility for protection of aliens (which includes the notion that treatment of aliens not be a 
“denial of justice”). Also, the equitable considerations underpinning the concept of odious debt 
are an obvious answer to a claim of unjust enrichment, i.e. one of the essential elements of the 
odious debt concept is that the successor regime is not enriched unjustly by the funds in question, 
since they have been dissipated on purposes actually harmful to the interests of the people, or the 
successor regime itself. As the Iran Claims Tribunal noted in Flexi-Van Leasing Inc. v. Iran,
23 “It 
is inherent in the principle of unjust enrichment that there must have been an enrichment of one 
party to the detriment of the other. Where there is no ‘beneficial gain’ to the party allegedly 
enriched, the remedy of unjust enrichment is not available.”   
 
While considerations of odiousness may affect claims that non-repayment of debt to private 
creditors constitute a violation of international law, it is a separate question whether 
considerations of odiousness might affect the obligations of debtor States to private creditors 
under domestic private law. This is usually specified as the law of the contract in the case of state 
contracts with private creditors. In this respect, it is worth noting the widespread concept of 
contract law that invalidates a contract for an illegal purpose, even where such invalidity would 
leave the party proposing the illegal purpose personally enriched.  
 
Of significance here is the United States case of Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, discussed 
above in connection with the issue of determining creditor knowledge of odiousness. In Adler, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed the action of a United States 
citizen seeking to recover monies spent (purportedly) to advance an undertaking with the purpose 
of fraudulently extracting public funds in Nigeria through the collusion of corrupt officials. The 
                                                 
23 12 Iran-U.S. C.T.R., 335, 352. 20 
appeals court held that the contractual claim must be dismissed on the grounds of “unclean 
hands” on the part of the plaintiffs. It found that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to have 
actively devised or proposed the illegal purpose, but only that they voluntarily participated in it. 
Moreover, it was irrelevant that the defendants were more at fault than the plaintiffs. In this 
particular case, the court pointed to the illegality of the contract in the United States where the 
plaintiff was seeking relief, citing United States anti-corruption laws. However, the contract was 
also illegal in its purpose under the laws of Nigeria. There is obviously considerable overlap 
between some of the elements of “odiousness” and the closely related notions of “clean hands” 
and the defense of illegality in contract law. Many odious purposes might even be illegal under 
the law prevailing at the time in the oppressive regime in question. For example, South African 
human rights abuses were conducted through deviation from the formal law existing in the 
regime. Moreover, they may be illegal and contrary to public in the forum State where the 
creditor is seeking to enforce the contract.  
 
Ex ante designation of debt as odious 
 
As noted, one of the major policy concerns that has deterred some transitional regimes from 
repudiating “odious” debt from the previous regime is that of reputation in the capital markets; a 
transitional regime may be concerned that creditors will not in the future provide access to funds, 
because they are unable to distinguish the exceptional political decision to repudiate debt due to 
its odiousness from the general creditworthiness of the regime. Whether this is empirically true or 
not, it does appear to influence decision-making of transitional regimes (e.g. South Africa). 
Kremer and Jayachandran have argued that one way of addressing this problem would be to have 
some international institution declare ex ante that a regime is odious; in order to lend to such a 
regime, a creditor would then have to exercise due diligence to ensure that the funds were applied 
to legitimate, non-odious purposes, in order to avoid the possibility of a successor regime 
repudiating the debt as odious (Kremer and Jayachandran, 2002; Jayachandran et al., 2005). This 
approach would have the advantage of deterring lending to odious regimes in the first place as 
well as giving a transitional regime a kind of “cover” for repudiating the debt, since the creditor 
would have known ex ante that it could not be expected to be repaid by that new regime. Kremer 
and Jayachandran consider different possible types of institution, including a council of 
independent jurists, the United Nations Security Council and even a major non-governmental 
organization such as Transparency International.  
 
As a matter of political feasibility, it is to be doubted whether consensus in the international 
community could easily be achieved to transfer to any new body the power to make such 
sensitive judgments concerning the nature of a particular existing regime and its capacity to 
participate in international economic relations. But within certain limits, the Security Council 
could now under the Charter of the United Nations arguably make such judgments, provided that 
the odiousness of the regime had effects on international peace and security, which is the key area 
of competence of the Security Council.
24 Within the Security Council, it is difficult to believe, 
based on past and indeed current experience, that the members’ strategic and economic interests 
in the relation to the regime in question would not affect their willingness to declare it “odious.” 
 
One criterion that Kremer and Jayachandran suggest for “odiousness” is whether a regime is 
democratic. The most clear-cut case would be a military coup that replaces a democracy with an 
authoritarian regime: debt incurred by the new regime that is not used to benefit the people would 
be declared odious. In many other situations, however, the democracy criterion could lead to 
                                                 
24 Thus, the action of the Security Council in relation to apartheid was linked to the threat to regional security that was 
created by the pursuit of this policy within South Africa.    21 
uncertainty and opportunistic behavior when applied ex ante: for instance, in situations where an 
incumbent elected Government planned to rig elections or suspend democracy, it would simply 
have incentives to hide such an intent, borrowing as much as possible before the “odiousness” of 
the regime became apparent and was declared. Moreover, as a general matter, a regime in power 
has many means available to it to conceal information about its repressive activities and the way 
in which particular sources of funding are allocated to those activities: this may make the “due 
diligence” standard rather ineffective or difficult to apply. The possibility of an ex ante 
declaration of odiousness would further increase the regime’s incentives to hide its 
repressiveness. There are relatively few States today where there is no attempt at all at the 
appearance of democracy, i.e. no elections whatsoever. On the other hand, in the context of the 
new global environment, largely determined by overriding security concerns, it is not clear 
whether due diligence criteria would remain objective and not dictated by donor–creditor 
interests. Thus, ex ante judgments about odiousness, if based on a democracy criterion, would 
either have to be limited to only a small subset of all situations that are blatantly oppressive or 
more subtle judgments about the fairness of elections and related practices would need to be 
made. This is not to argue that such judgments could not be principled and objective, but only that 
building consensus in international institutions may be very difficult.  
  
 
VI. CONCLUSION: POLICY AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INVOCATION OF  
   THE ODIOUS DEBT CONCEPT IN TRANSITIONAL CONTEXTS 
 
It is well established in international law that a political transition, even from an oppressive 
regime to a popularly legitimized one, does not in itself break the continuity of state-to-state debt 
obligations, even where the transition involves state succession. 
 
At the same time, state practice, the rulings of international tribunals and the writings of most 
academic authorities reflect acceptance of some equitable limits to the sanctity of state-to-state 
debt agreements. The international law obligation to repay debt has never been accepted as 
absolute, and has frequently been limited or qualified by a range of equitable considerations, 
some of which may be regrouped under the concept of “odiousness”. This is consistent with the 
accepted view that equity constitutes part of the content of “the general principles of law of 
civilized nations,” one of the fundamental sources of international law stipulated in the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice.  
  
The concept of “odious debt” regroups a particular set of equitable considerations that have often 
been raised to adjust or sever debt obligations in the context of political transitions. A survey of 
such transitional situations in the past or present indicates that the way in which the “odiousness” 
is argued as a ground for limiting obligations, which varies from one transitional context to 
another, and may differ depending on whether the transition involved, is for instance a secession, 
whether it arises from war or decolonization or simply a political revolution.  
 
In a number of the situations in question, tribunals or other States have rejected or questioned 
claims to adjust or sever debt obligations based on considerations of “odiousness.” However, this 
has usually been because of doubts on the facts as to whether the debt in question was “odious” or 
actually conferred some benefits on the population or the new regime. In none of these situations 
was a claim of odious debt rejected on grounds that international law simply does not 
countenance alteration in state-to-state debt obligations based on any equitable considerations 
whatever. In some situations, the debtor State made overly broad claims to repudiation of debt 
obligations (the case of attempted Soviet repudiation of Tsarist debts and more recently the 22 
Islamic Republic of Iran’s attempted repudiation of pre-revolutionary debts before the Iran 
Claims Tribunal).  
 
Political transitions pose complex, multi-faceted challenges for the transitional regime, from 
accountability for wrongs of the past, to establishing a framework of legal stability and economic 
reconstruction. Dealing with odious debt from the prior regime usually involves political as well 
as legal considerations. Even where a strong legal argument exists for repudiation of some or all 
debt based on considerations of odiousness, a transitional regime may well prefer to negotiate a 
voluntary adjustment in obligations with its creditors or even to continue to repay the debt. South 
Africa is a case in point. Such decisions do not detract from the availability of considerations of 
odiousness as a legal basis for alteration of debt obligations, but rather simply testify that 
transitional justice is political, and not just legal.  
 
The complexity and variety of transitional contexts further suggests that there is no single obvious 
legal forum for the adjudication or settlement of claims of odiousness. Depending on context, 
such claims might appropriately be raised in bilateral or multilateral negotiations on debt relief, or 
they could be adjudicated in the context of arbitration or domestic litigation. State-to-state debt 
contracts may specify a forum for the settlement of disputes. However, invocation of the concept 
of odious debt in multiple forums in respect of diverse debt contracts involving the same debtor 
State risks inconsistent decisions. Here, the examination of considerations of odiousness by a 
single special transitional tribunal seized with all the claims related to the political transition in 
question may be an attractive solution. The interests of consistency and predictability would 
argue in favor of the debtor State and its creditor States agreeing on the jurisdiction of such a 
single tribunal and perhaps also the range of equitable considerations, including “odiousness”, 
that it is to apply. 
 
With respect to obligations of debtor States to private, i.e. non-state, creditors, there is no 
established rule of international law that requires that these be continued in the case of political 
transition. Only where changes in contractual rights amount to a denial of justice or otherwise fall 
short of the minimum standard of treatment of aliens in customary international law, or where 
these changes can be characterized as an expropriation of property rights or unjust enrichment, 
can any claim be established against the debtor State in international law. Where odiousness can 
be established, it would be very difficult for a private creditor or a State espousing its claim to 
argue successfully that the alteration of contractual rights is a denial of justice. Nor could the 
alteration of contractual rights be considered fundamentally unfair or discriminatory and thereby 
a violation the customary international law standard of treatment for aliens.
25 At the same time, 
most debt contracts between States and private creditors are governed by the domestic private law 
specified in the contract. The legal systems of these jurisdictions may well have concepts such as 
“clean hands” or the notion that contracts related to illegal purposes are invalid. These concepts 
overlap with elements of the notion of “odiousness” as a basis for invalidating debt obligations. 
Investor/state arbitration tribunals, for example, have been comfortable taking into account such 
considerations in determining whether repudiation of contractual obligations to an investor by the 
host State is consistent with international law. This suggests that such concepts may indeed form 
part of the content of equity as “a general principle of law of civilized nations”, especially if 
widely shared among different legal systems.  
                                                 
25 Nor could it be claimed that an unjust enrichment occurred, since a key aspect of odiousness is the notion 
that the population of the debtor State did not benefit from the loan.    23 
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